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Challenging Political Culture in Postwar 
Austria: Veterans' Associations, Identity, 
and the Problem of Contemporary History 
Matthew Paul Berg 
Since the Waldheim election and the almost simultaneous appearance of Jorg 
Haider, recent history is a permanent guest at the center of politics.1 
THIS 
observation, registered by Marianne Enigl and Herbert Lackner, 
points to an incontestable and compelling feature of contemporary 
Austrian political culture: during the 1980s and 1990s, the first mean- 
ingful steps toward an Austrian Vergangenheitsbewaltigung developed out of a dis? 
cussion of Austrians, military service during the Nazi era and its highly prob- 
lematic association with wartime atrocities and genocide. Exploration of this 
important theme had been avoided throughout the period of the Second 
Republic by a carefully cultivated expression of public memory. The inherent 
tension between the internationally sanctioned notion of Austrian victimization 
during the Nazi years and the pride of many Austrian veterans in having per- 
formed their soldierly duties (Wehrpflichterflillung) had been a taboo subject. 
Domestic reactions to the international controversy surrounding Kurt 
Waldheim's successful 1986 presidential campaign, however, reduced the psy? 
chological barriers that had enabled?indeed, encouraged?many Austrians to 
repress reflections upon their own experiences under the Third Reich, and had 
largely checked the extent to which the period was subject to critical scrutiny.2 
This article developed from a paper presented at the Twentieth Annual Conference of the German 
Studies Association Seatde, 10-13 October 1996. I would like to thank Oliver Rathkolb, Anton 
Pelinka, and Giinter Bischof for their comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Pamela 
Mason for her critical reading of an earlier draft. 
1. Marianne EnigJ and Herbert Lackner, "Die verschiittete Geschichte," Prqfil 6 (3 February 
1996): 21. All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted. 
2. Among the important contributions to a reexamination of this repressed past are Gerhard 
Botz, "Osterreich und die NS-Vergangenheit:Verdrangung, Pflichterfiillung, Geschichtsklitterung" 
in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Dincr, 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1987), 141-52; Siegfried Matd and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, "Abwehr und 
Inszenierung im Labyrinth der Zweiten Republik" in NS-Herrschqft in Osterreich 1938-1945, ed. 
Emmerich Talos, Ernst Hanisch, and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), 601-24; Richard 
Central European History, vol. 30, no. 4, 513-544 
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The difficulties in managing historical memory are evident in the challeng- 
ing conundrum stemming from Waldheim's military service?or, for that mat? 
ter, that of any Austrian veteran: how could one take pride in having "done one's 
duty" in the uniform of the Wehrmacht or SS, yet lay claim to victimization at 
the hands of the Nazi regime? In Waldheim's case this issue was approached, ini? 
tially, in the most reticent fashion; once broached, it led to bitter debate. Jorg 
Haider's statements and symbolic actions, on the other hand, have represented a 
righteous, defiant proscription of the prevailing, tacit consensus of fifty years that 
this past was to be minimized, if not ignored outright. Several months before the 
Waldheim Affair focused closer attention on Austria's past, Haider, a member of 
the first postwar generation and then-emerging leader of the right-wing 
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Austrian Freedom Party; hereafter FPO), 
praised former SS members at a veterans, reunion in late 1985, telling them that 
their sacrifices had saved the Heimat and Western Europe from bolshevism.3 
Only ten years later, prior to the December 1995 Austrian federal elections, 
footage of yet another (and clearly not infrequent) Haider appearance before a 
Waffen SS reunion was broadcast on German television. On this occasion he 
lauded the veterans as decent men of unimpeachable moral character. 
The Waldheim controversy and Haider s carefully chosen, impolitic remarks 
frame the central theme to be explored in this essay?namely, the place of mar- 
tial values in a fragile and in some respects ambivalent construction of Austrian 
identity during the initial postwar years. The Allies' determination not to issue 
a pronouncement of collective guilt for waging a war of aggression or crimes 
against humanity, coupled with a then-widely accepted representation of the 
Wehrmacht as a politically neutral, professional military force, spared most sol? 
diers from prosecution, and many other Austrians the need for uncomfortable 
introspection.4 Austrian veterans and civilians were protected by the Moscow 
Declaration (1943), reiterated at Yalta two years later, that Austria had been the 
first victim of German aggression.5 
Mitten, The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice: The Waldheim Phenomenon i  Austria (Boulder, 1992); 
Meinrad Ziegler and Waltraud Kannonicr-Finster, Osterreichs Geddchtnis: Uber Erinnem und Vergessen 
der NS-Vergangenheit (Vienna, 1993); Gerhard Botz and Gerald Sprengnagel, eds., Kontroversen um 
Osterreichs Zeitgeschichte: Verdrdngte Vergangenheit, Osterreich-Identitat, Waldheim und die Historiker 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1994). 
3. Brigitte Bailer-Galanda, Haider wortlich (Vienna, 1995), 102; cited originally in Kartner 
Nachrichten, 13 October4985. 
4. For a survey of the integration of the First Republic s Bundesheer into the Wehrmacht and 
Austrian participation in the Third Reich's armed forces, see Walter Manoschek and Hans Safrian, 
"Osterreicher in der Wehrmacht," inTalos, et al., NS-Herrschqft, 331-60. The essay focuses on the 
war in the Balkan theater. 
5. Developed originally as a psychological weapon by British officials and supported by their 
American counterparts to exploit "anti-Prussian" sentiment within Austria, the Moscow 
Dcclaration, Robert Keyserlingk explains,"came to be considered a gauge of Allied wartime inten? 
tions"?particularly with the emergence of the Cold War?concerning the restoration of Austria 
and was integrated into the legal-political basis of the Second Austrian Republic." Keyserlingk, 
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The notion of Austrian victimization enshrined in the Moscow Declaration, 
linked with the Allied rejection of a collective guilt clause for Austria, has been 
apdy referred to as the "Magna Carta of the Second Republic"6 and as the 
source of the Austrian Lebensluge?i.e., that of collective victimization rather 
than many troubling instances of individual complicity.7 Moreover, it became 
the basis for a national myth; as Robert Knight points out, it legitimized the 
myth of victimization.8 This formalized expression of public memory, reiterat- 
ed in 1955 in the State Treaty that ended the occupation of Austria, confirmed 
the sense of disillusionment which a great many Austrians felt by war's end, and 
served as a kind of collective exoneration for the years 1938-1945. For the vast 
majority of former soldiers in particular, the Moscow Declaration facilitated the 
separation of Nazi-era military service from its association with genocidal con? 
flict.9 Moreover, the Opferthese, with its function as an agent for memory repres? 
sion10 came to represent a direct, embarrassing challenge to one of the central 
questions for postwar identity formation: what role, if any, might martial values 
play if an inchoate sense of Osterreichertum was to be founded upon principles 
Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma (Kingston, Ontario, 1988), 4. See also Giinter 
Bischof, "Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklarung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg," 
Zeitgeschichte 20 (1993): 345-66. Bischof s essay is both a thoughtful discussion of how Austrian 
politicians exploited the notion of victimization, particularly during the 1940s and 1950s, and a fine 
historiographical contribution. 
6. Thomas Albrich,"'Es gibt keine jiidische Frage': Zur Aufrechtcrhaltung des osterrcichischen 
Mythos," in Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust: Europa?USA?Israel, ed., Rolf Steininger (Vienna, 
1994), 147f. 
7. See Anton Pelinka and Erika Weinzierl, eds., Das grosse Tabu: Osterreichs Umgang mit seiner 
Vergangenheit (Vienna, 1987), as well as Gerhard Botz,"Geschichte und kollektives Gedachtnis in der 
Zweiten Republik:'Opferthese/'Lebensluge' und Geschichtstabu in der Zeitgeschichtsschrcibung" 
in Inventur 45/55: Osterreich im ersten Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik, ed. Wolfgang Kos and Georg 
Rigele (Vienna, 1996), 51-85. To place Austrian circumstances regarding the delicate, yet highly- 
charged matters of denazification, dealing with collaborators, and Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in a 
broader European context, see Dieter Stiefel, Entnazifizierung in Osterreich (Vienna, 1981); Sebastian 
Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley, and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., Verdrangte Schuld, verfehlte Suhne: 
Entnazifizierung in Osterreich (BadVoslau, 1986);Heidemarie Uhl, Zwischen Versbhnung und Verstorung: 
Eine Kontroverse um Osterreichs istorische Identitat fiinfzig Jahre nach dem "Anschluss" (Vienna. 1992); 
Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., Politische Sauberung in Europa: Die Abrechnung mit 
Faschismus und KoUaboration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1991); Henry Russo, The Vxchy 
Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge, MA, 1991). 
8. Robert Graham Knight, "Besiegt oder befreit? Eine volkerrechdiche Frage historisch 
betrachtet," in Die bevormundete Nation: Osterreich und die Allierten, 1945-1949, ed. Giinter Bischof 
and Josef Lcidenfiost (Innsbruck, 1988), 77. 
9. The notion of the Austrian soldier-as-victim was underscored in the first parliamentary ses? 
sion of the Second Republic. "Those who had always condemned this [National Socialist] regime 
and the war," declared Chancellor Leopold FigJ (OVP), "now return with the stigma of having 
fought for this regime. We know that during the war each of the Allied powers had already made the 
distinction between these victims of terror and those who stood behind them, in order to drive them 
to the front." Figls speech met with wildly enthusiastic response from Volkspartei, Socialist, and 
Communist delegates, while the high commanders of the four occupation forces looked benignly 
from the loges upon the assembly. Sten.Prot.NR,V. G.P., 2nd Session, 21 December 1945,19. 
10. On the repression of memory, see Ziegler and Kannonier-Finster, Osterreichs Gedachtnis. 
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such as international cooperation, reconciliation between peoples, and perma? 
nent neutrality? 
Problematizing State Identity in 
Contemporary Austrian Political Culture 
Well into the mid-1980s, the peculiar dynamic of postwar Austrian political cul? 
ture had encouraged the sublimation, if not outright repression, of the inher- 
endy inconsistent soldier/victim dualism as politically expedient. Political cul? 
ture, as I employ the concept here, refers to the "grammar" of public discourse, 
in which the range of the permissible and the taboo is structured according to 
specific rules, whether openly articulated or tacidy acknowledged. These rules 
may evolve as conditions change.11 Political culture in the Second Republic, I 
argue, was and still is shaped primarily by three clusters of factors. First, Austria's 
people, not unlike other Europeans, exhausted by interwar civil conflict and 
several years of war-induced misery, were convinced that economic prosperity, 
welfare, and social peace would check the appeal of left or right-wing extrem- 
ism after 1945. Consequendy, they embraced cooperative, consensual strategies 
for the resolution of pressing social, economic, and political problems associat- 
ed with reconstruction and recovery. In the Austrian case, however, there was 
also a widespread recognition that consensus-based solutions would minimize 
intrusions by Allied occupation authorities into domestic affairs. Second, along 
with most Central and Eastern European peoples, Austrians experienced a series 
of rapid transformations of political regimes between 1918 and 1945?includ? 
ing some combination of monarchy, a short-lived republic, an indigenous 
authoritarian government, National Socialist dictatorship, and occupation. The 
stability essential to the success of the Austrian Second Republic was contin- 
gent not only upon popular acceptance of, but also continued support for, sta- 
ble democratic institutions and a distincdy Austrian identity, the latter founded 
on the principle of victimization. This necessitated the population s willingness 
to accept new forms of civic education and the development of a state con? 
sciousness based in part upon the selective appropriation of time-honored 
Habsburg and First Republic symbols, and, more significandy, the creation of 
viable new symbols and practices capable of nurturing and sustaining a fragile 
and as yet uncertain new identity. To a significant extent, the elements of this 
revised sense of Osterreichertum developed in response to external factors?the 
complex and somewhat contradictory nature of the Allied occupation on the 
11. This notion is adapted from Clifford Geertz's assertion that an interpretive theory of culture 
has the twofold task of disccrning"the conceptual structures that inform our subjects' acts, the 'said' 
of social discourse, and to construct a system of analysis in whose terms what is generic to those 
structures, what belongs to them because they are what they are, will stand out against the other 
determinants of human behavior." Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York, 1973), 27. 
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one hand, and the popular desire of most Austrians to distance themselves from 
the trappings of a greater German Volksgemeinschqft, on the other?rather than 
ftom a militandy self-conscious, widespread Austrian particularism that had 
been violendy suppressed by the Nazi regime.12 Third, as intimated in the 
Enigl/Lackner quotation, an unspoken agreement not to address past conflict 
(the resentments and anger stemming from the civil war atmosphere of 
1918-1934; the Catholic conservative Austrofascist regime of 1934-1938; and 
the generally passive acceptance of the National Socialist dictatorship, or 
instances of active complicity in its repressive and genocidal measures) effec- 
tively precluded genuinely critical attempts to come to terms with it.To accept 
this distancing of society from the past was to preserve the Austrian Lebensluge 
against critical revisionists. 
The social democratic parliamentarian Peter Kostelka remarked recendy 
that "Austria's political culture distinguishes itself through an inability to 
engage in conflict."13 Taking the point a step further, I suggest that postwar, 
consensus-oriented Austrian political culture has promoted the displacement 
of the essential content of debate over Austrian identity into the cultural realm. 
More specifically, formal institutions such as governmental coalitions forged by 
the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs (Austrian Socialist Party; hereafter SPO) 
and Catholic-conservative Osterreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Peoples 
Party; hereafter OVP) camps (1945-1966 and 1986-present), and the informal 
"social partnership" of SPO labor and OVP business and agricultural interests 
(1945-present) created parameters within which social conflict can be man- 
aged?preempting the sorts of bitter conflict over justice in the workplace and 
constitutional issues that had debilitated the interwar republic. Contestation of 
incipient identity in the Second Republic, then, was sublimated into areas in 
which successful negotiation was far from a foregone conclusion?i.e., into the 
venues of cultural and social reproduction. One finds it manifested at a num? 
ber of sites: the choice/interpretation of classic German dramatic and musical 
works at the Viennese Burgtheater,Volkstheater, or the various Festwochen; lob- 
bying for the protection of cultural autonomy for German-speaking minori- 
ties in South Tyrol; the content of historical education for primary and see- 
12. Vto-Anschluss sentiment had existed since the end of the monarchy, however, and in the case 
of the German National camp from as early as the late nineteenth century. On Anschluss thought 
prior to the Nazi takeover see Helmut Konrad, ed., Sozialdemokratie und "Anschluss": 
HistorischeWUrzeln des Anschlusses 1918 und 1938 (Vienna, 1978) and Stanley Suval, The Anschluss 
Question in the Weimar Era:A Study of Nationalism in Germany and Austria, 1918-1932 (Baltimore, 
1974). 
13. Peter Kostelka "Schulterschluss uncrwunscht," WienerJournal 189 (June 1996): lO.This point 
was made in conjunction with an evaluation of Austro-German relations in the mid-1990s. 
Although he was at least as concerned with the pervasiye problem pf contemporary Austrian-style 
parliamentary gridlock as with skirting around the morass of highly-chargcd historical memory, 
Kostelka s comment corroborates the notion that petty disputes have become a substitute for sub- 
stantive debate over issues which might compel one to discuss issues related to a volatile past. 
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ondary school students; the role of the Roman Catholic Church in religious 
and public education, and its influence upon abortion legislation. These exam? 
ples, case studies into the nexus between the realms of politics and culture in 
their own right, suggest the engagement of a variety of institutions with the 
politics of identity. 
This essay takes into consideration a rather different locus in the politics of 
Austrian identity formation?that of Austrian Second World War veterans and 
their ambiguous notion of community during the 1950s. I do not contend, 
thereby, that the potential for a revived militarism or German-national senti? 
ment has been deeply rooted or widespread in the Second Republic. Rather, I 
argue that the Soldatenverbande and Soldatentreffen (veterans' associations and vet- 
erans'reunions, respectively) represented an embarrasment and grounds for con? 
cern for those officials determined to nurture an embryonic, still-indeterminate 
sense of Austrianness in the 1950s. With each ritual celebration of camaraderie, 
participants in veterans' organizations sought to reestablish an exclusive sense of 
Gemeinschaft that reaffirmed their identity as former soldiers of the Third Reich. 
In the process, Kameradschaftsbiindler created a troublesome victim/perpetrator 
dualism for those entrusted with building a credible post-Nazi Austrian com? 
munity. 
A comprehensive history of Austrian veterans has yet to be written. This 
study seeks to consolidate and advance the small body of literature on veterans' 
activities, and to explore the contradiction they posed to the fundamental leit- 
motif of Austrian political culture: the official myth of victimhood. Thus, I am 
at least as interested in official Austrian reaction to veterans' activities, as it 
worked to contain them, as I am in the veterans' associations themselves. 
Included here is a discussion of the Fronterlebnis in World War I and theoretical 
reflections upon its significance for community-building between 1914 and 
1918, as well as upon the sanctification of this experience during the Third 
Reich. The body of the essay is an exploration of the enduring importance of 
the Frontgemexnschaft for organized, right-wing veterans after 1945 and efforts by 
Austrian authorities and particularly the Austrian Left to check their influence. 
Contemporary historians should take note that archival source material that had 
been generated by Kameradschaftsbunde themselves is likely to remain frustrat- 
ingly incomplete. During the 1950s, veterans associations expressed their views 
far more frequendy through ritual practice than in written form. Newspaper 
editorials represented the principal exception which survives into the present; 
veterans' associations newsletters and magazines from the period were subject to 
strict censorship by Austrian and Allied Control Commission authorities. The 
most consistent and informative primary sources for Kameradschaftsbund self- 
expression come from two sources: first, Interior Ministry reports on the con? 
stitution of groups and the nature of their activities forwarded to Vienna by 
provincial police officials; and second, the statements of right-wing (and even 
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OVP) member-champions of Kameradschaftsbunde sitting in high-profile public 
forums such as the Nationalrat.14 
Theoretical Reflections on Comradeship 
During the Two World Wars 
The phenomenon of veterans' associations and the commemoration of the dead 
after the Second World War, particularly with respect to Austria, have only just 
begun to attract scholarly attention.15 A considerably larger body of historical 
scholarship has concerned itself with the cultural history of the First World War 
experience, and this literature raises questions and themes which can inform 
reflection upon veterans after 1945.16 Among the latter, Eric Leed's now-classic 
work, informed by Victor Turner's theory of symbols and social structure, offers 
a most compelling point of departure for the study of the soldier's experience 
as a complex of rituals involving separation, liminality, and aggregation. This 
approach is particularly instructive when brought to bear upon the ambiguous 
nature of commemoration of World War II service on the part of Austrian 
Kameradschaftsbunde and its relationship to post-1945 identity formation. 
Modris Eksteins has argued with respect to the First World War that the indis- 
soluble connection which men forged in combat 
. . . was . . . not all that resilient outside of the batde zone when men were 
forced to confront the complexities of the "real" world. The intensity of feel? 
ing and companionship belonged to a similar time and place. That explains 
why some soldiers were keen to get back to the trenches, from leave and from 
rest quarters.17 
14. The latter source is a particularly informative one. FPO parliamentary representatives (a great 
number of them had been Nazis, and were denied their political liberty until 1949), as officials 
freely-electcd by a decriminalized constituency, sought to impart an air of legitimacy to 
Kameradschaftsbund membership that conflicted with the governing parties' attempts to sweep them 
under the rug?lcst the occupation forces (particularly the USSR and France) find grounds to reex- 
amine the vaUdity of the Austrian Opferthese. 
15. For the Austrian case see Reinhold Gartner and Sieglinde Rosenberger, Kriegerdenkmdler 
(Innsbruck, 1991); Stefan Riesenfellner and Heidemarie Uhl, eds., Todeszeichen: Zeitgeschichtliche 
Denkmalkultur in Graz und in der Steiermark vom Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart (Vienna, 
1994); Heidemarie Uhl,"Erinnerung alsVersohnung: Zur Denkmalkultur und Geschichtspolitik der 
Zweiten Republik," Zeitgeschichte 23 (1996): 146-60. A more comprehensive European study is 
George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory ofthe World Wars (Oxford, 1990). On the pol? 
itics of veterans' associations as interest group lobbies within the sphere of social welfare policy, see 
James M. Diehl, The Thanks ofthe Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War (Chapel Hill, 
1993). 
16. See, for example, Eric J. Lced, No Man's Land: Combat and Identily in World War I (Cambridge, 
1979); Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth ofthe Modern Age (New York, 
1989); Robert W.Whalen, Bitter Wounds: German Victims ofthe Great War, 1914-1939 (Ithaca, 1984); 
Jay Winter, Sites ofMemory, Sites of Mourning-.The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge, 
1995). 
17. Eksteins, Rites of Spring, 232. 
520 CHALLENGING POLITICAL CULTURE 
This sentiment, Leed suggests, was the result of habituation to aggression 
through the experience of combat, a cohesion born of cohabitation of a limi- 
nal state in which customary, civilian mores were abrogated.18 The resultant 
behavior was marked by "radical discontinuity on every level of consciousness," 
and characterized by actions that are taboo in a conventional social structure. 
Turner's concept of liminality, situated within the framework of religious ritu? 
al, focuses upon the novice's separateness from the ordinary structures of "con- 
ventionally" constituted society?i.e., the person in a liminal state, on the 
threshold between two disparate realities, participates in an extra-ordinary tran- 
sitional community.19 Leed argues that the soldier's experience, from his initial 
military training through his life under combat conditions, is characterized by a 
profound form of separation from his former, normative community, followed 
by aggregation into an existential communitas in which the individual's previous 
social status is transcended: 
The experience of living outside of class as a declassified, or not-yet-classi- 
fied, individual was productive of a sense of comradeship among those who 
shared this situation. The lack of status of the frontsoldiery, like the statusless- 
ness of a liminal group, can seem to be both a painful loss of identity and a 
positive liberation from those social distinctions which customarily prevent 
the formation of close personal bonds across class lines. In going to war the 
soldier was stripped of the visible marks of status?clothes, address, property, 
insignia of social rank?that defined his place in society. The formal equality 
of the army was not, however, comradeship, as many young middle-class vol? 
unteers found out. Comradeship came only after the invisible marks of sta? 
tus?attitudes, education, ways of speaking and other manners?were 
erased. . .20 
Such a process, then, would account for the sense of disassociation, even dis- 
comfort, that Eksteins notes many Worid War I combat troops tended to feel 
during temporary (re)aggregation into conventional society on leave or on rare 
visits home without having been formaUy discharged from their particular lim? 
inal state?i.e., the comradeship of the front, either in the east or the west. In 
Germany and to some extent in Austria as well, the solidarity of this "commu? 
nity on the threshold" between life and death found expression in the 
Frontkdmpfer tradition, in the Kampfgemeinschqft of those who had been through 
18. Lced, No Man's Und, 3,8ff. 
19. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca, 1991 [originally 1969]), 94-103 
and 127-40, particularly 132. Within this liminal, or transitional phase, the fellowship of neophytes 
results in the creation of a special, temporary community at the margins of normative society, 
referred to by Turner as existential communitas; idem, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in 
Human Society (Ithaca, 1994 [originally 1974]), 169. 
20. Leed, No Man's Land, 25. 
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the experience of conflict shaped by the unprecedented destructive power of 
the period's advanced weaponry.21 
Frontkdmpfer and Frontgemeinschaft 
In the particular case ofWorld War II, the formation of a front-soldier identity 
was linked to the heroically-depicted myth ofthe Fronteriebnis of 1914-1918 
cultivated by veterans, as well as to the respect for the myth inculcated in youth 
during the 1930s and early 1940s. In the case ofthe armed forces themselves, 
an outright emphasis upon "the myth of the so-called Frontgemeinschaft of 
1914-1918," explains Omer Bartov, with "the related belief that only total spir? 
itual commitment would enable one to withstand, if not actually celebrate, the 
horrors of modern war.. ." linked members of the Wehrmacht to veterans of 
the Great War, and contributed forcefully to a sense of soldierly community in 
the Wehrmacht.22 Solidarity intrinsic to the concept of Gemeinschaft, born out 
of the quasi-sacral experience of warfare as a sanctified state, would promote a 
very high degree of unit cohesion in the armed forces ofthe Third Reich23 and 
would foster the strong postwar ties among many veterans which translated into 
the formation of veterans' associations. 
In his discussion ofthe socialization of boys through the Hider Youth into 
a militant "rebellious conformism," Bartov notes that their education "did not 
make them all into committed Nazis." He suggests most convincingly that this 
upbringing, nonetheless, "provided them with an oudook that profoundly 
influenced their manner of both physically and mentally coping with and 
reacting to the realities of the war [. . .] whether or not they happened to be 
enamored of the regime."24 Bartov's point is substantiated by work on the 
Hider Youth (HJ) that has underscored the value the regime placed upon the 
martial training and Nazi Staatsburgerkunde to which boys were subjected in 
21. The new experience of combat as a product of new weaponry is too large a topic to address 
here, but a fine corpus of scholarly work has been devoted to the subject. See, for example, John 
Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hett.Trench Warfare in World War I (Baltimore, 1976); Denis Winter, Death's Men: 
Soldiers of the Great War (Harmondsworth, 1979); Eksteins, Rites of Spring; Bernd Ulrich and 
Bcnjamin Ziemann, eds., Frontatttag im Ersten Weltkrieg: Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 
1994). 
22. Omer Bartov, HitlersArmy: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1992), 60. My 
emphasis. See also Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland, 45f and Stephen G. Fritz, Frontsoldaten:The 
German Soldier in World War II (Lexington, KY, 1995), 188-90,207-8,217-18. 
23. On the issue of solidarity see also Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and 
Disintegration in the wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (1948): 28O-309.This 
classic essay, the best of early work on the source of the Wehrmacht's internal strength as well as its 
limits, advances a version of the "rational actor" model of individual and group behavior. While per? 
suasive in many respects, it fails to develop sufficiendy the importance of the central concept of 
comradeliness, without which the Frontgemeinschaft could not have existed. Solidarity, I suggest, can? 
not be easily accounted for in a rational-choice influenced approach. 
24. Omer Bartov, "The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of Warfare," Journal of 
Modern History 64 (Supplement, 1992): 42. 
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their formal capacity as HJ members and in the course of their schooling. HJ 
participation had become mandatory for all German?and Austrian?boys by 
the time ofthe invasion of Poland in September 1939, and served, indeed, as 
a viable institution through which to cultivate a Nazi interpretation of sol- 
dierly virtues. Wehrmacht and SS recruiters competed actively against one 
another to attract the elite among late teenaged Hider Youth members; by 
1942 Wehrertuchtigungslager der Hitlerfugend provided a forum in which boys 
between sixteen and eighteen spent three weeks, under the tutelage of SS, 
army, and air force trainers, engaged in intensive exercises and drills intended 
to develop character, military readiness, and combat capabilities. The trainers 
drew upon the boys' previous ten years' regimen of physical education as a 
basis for this premilitary training.25 This emphasis upon preparing boys phys- 
ically for the regime's conception of a Manichaean struggle for living space 
and racial mastery was complemented, of course, by a thorough nazification 
of historical and biological education, the class barrier-breaking potential of 
Labor Service, and the virtual deification of Hider as the omniscient and 
omnipotent Fiihrer. All contributed to a climate in which boys were likely to 
accept the general features (at the very least) of the Nazi ideal of the 
Volksgemeinschaft-as-Kampfgemeinschaft once they entered the Wehrmacht or 
theWaffen-SS. 
According to Turner, the "neophyte in liminality must be a tabula rasa [. . .] 
on which is inscribed the wisdom ofthe group, in those respects that pertain to 
new status."26 Given the hallowed character attributed to conflict in the service 
of National Socialism as inculcated through the teaching of history, popular 
propaganda, and military training, the front line soldiers experience of combat 
may have been less the inscription of a sacred mystery upon a naive neophyte, 
and more the confirmation of what passed for self-evident truth imparted 
through earlier socialization. Because the war against the Soviet Union was east 
as a racial crusade, an ideological war against an inferior, subhuman enemy 
(consider the infamous "Commissar Order"), wanton or excessive violence 
directed toward civilians, Soviet POWs, and particularly Jews rarely met with 
punishment, and was, rather, all too frequendy encouraged. 
Regardless of the symbolic capital in which the neophyte invested, whether 
or not a soldier considered himself a Nazi, an inveterate nationalist, or merely a 
25. See,in particular, Gerhard Rempel, Hitler's Children:The Hitler Youth and the SS (Chapel Hill, 
1989), 173-204, esp. 184, and Peter D. Stachura, "Das Dritte Reich und die Jugenderziehung: Die 
Rolle der Hiderjugend 1933-1939," in Nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933-1945: Eine Bilanz, ed. 
Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funkc, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Bonn, 1986), 224-44. "To serve 
a Volksgemeinschaft, to live a life of camaraderie, to believe in the German people and Hider as the 
German Fuhrer," explains Stephen Fritz, "these were ideals pressed into the minds and souls of 
German youth." Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 161. 
26. Turner, The Ritual Process, 103. 
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defender of the Reich,27 the conclusion one might draw from the scholarship 
discussed above is that combat experience either fostered or reinforced a sense 
of Front- or Kampjgemeinschaft during the Second World War comparable to that 
of the 1914?1918 experience, but shaped by the even more highly-charged, 
extraordinary circumstances of a war of annihilation. The experience of the 
Frontgemeinschaft was such a profound one that the individual veteran could, as 
Leed has argued with respect to the World War I ex-serviceman, identify with 
the "rites and symbols" of the war years as a commemoration, even continued 
celebration of liminality, without necessarily supporting National Socialist or, 
later, Neo-Nazi principles.28 What follows is a discussion of veterans, groups as 
an expression of whatTurner refers to as normative communitas?the creation of 
a structured community through which a group that experienced a common, 
transformative experience attempts "to preserve, in and by its religious and eth? 
ical codes and legal and political regulations" the original experience of frater- 
nal Gemeinschqft.29 Juxtaposed with the emergence of Kameradschaftsbiinde is an 
examination of the Austrian authorities, attempts to monitor and contain them 
during the 1950s?a period during which the official Austrian state identity 
based on victimization began to gain wider currency, ana in which veterans* 
groups began to proliferate with the reenfranchisement of many former Nazis. 
Commemoration of Comradeship in the 
Second Republic: The Occupation Years 
Between the years 1914 and 1945, virtually all Germans and Austrians had 
themselves, or had seen a friend or relative, become a member of the imperial 
armed forces, a paramilitary formation, and/or a branch of the Third Reich's 
military machine. The experience of formal combat service ended when the 
National Socialist regime capitulated in the spring of 1945, yet the liminal char? 
acter of frontline solidarity transformed itself, for some, in the politicization of 
this experience after the war's end. The implications of this feeling of solidari? 
ty, the result of having existed on the threshold between youth and adulthood, 
life and death, one s status as a kind of crusader and one s reintegration into a 
defeated and often vilified social body, had important ramifications for the sta? 
bility of fledgling postwar Austrian and German societies. George L. Mosse has 
27. "We were never mercenaries, but?to use the hackneyed phrase?defenders of the 
Fatherland. There are certainly those among our ranks who fight for the idea of National Socialism, 
and others who fight for the fatherland, that spot on the map for which risking one's life remains 
self-evident. We lie together in the tent." This statement, authored by the young Landser Egon 
Freitag in August 1941, is a representative xample ofthe fine line between comradeship and the 
contours of Nazi weltanschauung, and in other cases the linkage between them. Cited in Bartov, 
Hitler's Army, 34. 
28. Leed, No Man's Land, 33. 
29. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 169; Turner, The Ritual Process, 132. 
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remarked that former soldiers of the Third Reich frequendy found that the 
"idea of self-sacrifice [was] motivated by a feeling of solidarity moved to the 
foreground [i.e.,] loyalty to individual fellow soldiers rather than to any over- 
riding purpose."30 Among a population exhausted by war and suffering total 
defeat, groups of former SS and even Wehrmacht members attempted to revive 
what Mosse has designated "the Myth of the War Experience"?the tendency 
to reflect upon batde as a formative, even sanctified experience, and to influ? 
ence collective memory to this end through the promotion of literary works 
and popular publications, film, posters, bric-a-brac, and membership associa? 
tions.31 Veterans who glorified their wartime existence through formal organi? 
zation did not likely comprise an overwhelming majority of former service- 
men. Nonetheless, the fact that such veterans could not find a fundamental 
sense of Gemeinschaft (outside that of the Fronterlebnis) capable of transcending 
what they regarded as the limiting structures of everyday civilian life once the 
war ended was a cause of concern for the authorities in postwar German and 
Austrian societies. 
All in all, the transition from the Frontgemeinschaft, where warfare had repre? 
sented the fundamental rite of passage in the National Socialist constellation of 
values, to civilian life in Germany and Austria proved itself to be a rather suc? 
cessful process. Paramilitary violence was never a reality after 1945; social wel? 
fare benefits were extended to veterans and returning POWs to ease their tran? 
sition; Red Cross, United Nations, and other international funding sources, as 
well as Marshall Plan monies, helped provide the basic necessities and capital for 
reconstruction in Western Germany and Austria, and the occupation authorities 
eflfectively monopolized the use of force. Veterans' associations, with their rever- 
ence for notions of duty and service designated as anathema after the capitula- 
tion, however, embodied a celebration/commemoration of a marginalized 
community that threatened both the newly-constituted legal order and, in the 
Austrian case, the myth of victimization. 
In the two Germanys the occupation authorities were naturally suspicious of 
veterans' unauthorized activities, as were state and federal authorities. Circum? 
stances in Austria were somewhat more complicated. The Allied Control 
Commission and federal and provincial officials shared the same concerns as 
their German counterparts for the democratic and antimihtaristic development 
of their populations, but in Austria those in positions of responsibility, as well as 
ordinary citizens, found themselves on the horns of a uniquely Austrian dilem? 
ma. On the one hand, many people from across the political spectrum had 
30. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 217. West German popular film and literature of the 1950s, Mosse 
points out,"pictured German soldiers, officers in particular, as dccent men of honor who were not 
to blame for the crimes of Hider or the loss of the war. Such decency, now central to the ideal of 
camaraderie, was a counterweight to a war fought in a bad cause." 
31. Ibid.,7ff. 
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fought in the war, and, even if not confirmed Nazis, believed that they had done 
their duty. "Duty to whom?" and "Duty to what end?" are, as noted, two ques? 
tions which those who would glorify the Frontkampfer experience avoided stu- 
diously.32 Rather than acknowledge that such sentiment competed with, and 
endangered the credibility of, the official, carefully nurtured myth of Austria-as- 
first-victim, advocates of a revived "Myth of the War Experience" attempted to 
exonerate Austrians?those who fought in a German war of conquest and also 
those who supported the regime on the home front?by lumping civilians and 
soldiers together as victims of "bombs, misery, hunger, need, and the 
Russians."33 On the other hand, a vocal minority, largely but not exclusively 
composed of Socialists and Communists, demanded that the experiences of the 
National Socialist era be rejected and the symbols and trappings of the period 
be eliminated. 
The first elected government of Austria's Second Republic took quick action 
against the exhibition of Third Reich military symbols, working with parlia- 
ment to enact legislation that oudawed the wearing of Wehrmacht uniforms,34 
Wearing the uniform or insignia of any SS branch had been prohibited as a 
consequence of the Provisional Government's sweeping measure oudawing the 
NSDAP within Austria in early May 1945.35 The law did not stipulate, howev? 
er, that prevention of public display of official Nazi-era dress would be coupled 
32. "When fulfillment of duty is spoken of in connection with combat action for the NS- 
Regime.it would be appropriate to rethink the notion of'duty' in this context. If instead of'duty,' 
'compulsion' were employed, then an understanding of the activities of German Wehrmacht sol? 
diers would be more easily possible, then the self-imposed justificatory ideal of former soldiers of 
the NS-Regime of this kind would no longer be necessary either." In Gartner and Rosenberger, 
Kriegerdenkmaler, 94. See also Heidemarie Uhl's content analysis of several recent articles written by 
Ingomar Pust in the Carinthian OVP's Neue Volkszeitung. Pust lamented the fate of the civil pop? 
ulation in fire-bombed Dresden (17 February 1988) and the heroic German army at Stalingrad (30 
January 1988), and justified brutal action on the part of the Wehrmacht against the "Tito-Partisans" 
(whom he lumped together with Slovenian resistance fighters) and Communists in the Balkans (13 
and 18 February 1988) in Uhl, Zwischen Versbhnung und Verstorung, 388-89. 
33. , 139. Uhl spares no criticism for those who appropriated the late Andreas Hillgruber's argu? 
ment in order to advance that Austrians, like the Germans, had defended " Volk und Vaterland" against 
murder, rape, plunder, and dislocation (ibid., 138). See also Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang: Die 
Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europaischen Judentums (Berlin, 1986), as well as 
Ziegler and Kanonnier-Finster.The authors' case studies provide analyses of the self-representations 
of average Austrians whose experiences as soldiers, police officers, or civilians had led them to con- 
clude that they had been victims?consistent with the notion of the Moscow Declaration-as- 
Magna Carta on the one hand, or agent of memory repression on the other. 
34. OStA/AdR, BKA 40.141-2/46. Parliamentary deputies approved the Uniform-Verbotsgesetz 
on 21 December 1945, not quite one full month after the Second Republic's first democratic elec? 
tions; it went into efFect on 15 January 1946 as BGB1.1945/12. Punishment for conviction carried 
a fine of up to OS 2,000 or a prison stay as long as two months. The law was not enforced consis? 
tently across provincial borders, or even within the same province. 
35. Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, Rudolf Jcrabck, and Leopold Kammerhofer, eds., Protokolle des 
Kabinettsrates der Provisorischen Regierung Karl Renner 1945, vol. 1:29. April bis KKJuli 1945 (Vienna, 
1995), 30-34.This section of the text refcrs to the discussion of StGBl. 1945/13,13 May 1945. See 
also Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 81-88. 
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with forced expiation for deeds the wearer may have committed while clothed 
in it?nor did it stipulate that some form of civic atonement was necessary for 
having "done one's duty" in the service of a "foreign" armed force. Problems 
stemming from the literal superficiality of this legislation manifested themselves 
particularly from 1949 into the early 1950s. This period marked the first of two 
surges of Austrian Kameradschaftsbund formation. While veterans' associations did 
exist prior to 1949, their number was negUgible and their activities understat- 
ed; their gatherings were not regarded as an embarrassment by Austrian officials 
or the occupation authorities, for they tended to avoid celebration ofthe ideo- 
logically-charged Frontgemeinschaft, and their members were not among those 
designated as Nazis according to the terms of denazification legislation ratified 
during the immediate postwar years.36 The number of Kameradschaftsbunde pro- 
liferated and the politically suspect character of their self-conception changed 
after 1948, when large numbers of former Nazis judged to be less incriminat- 
ed (minderbelastet, as opposed to those designated belastet) were permitted full 
participation in civic life, including the right to form associations.37 In Styria, 
the provincial Kameradschaftsbund association numbered 300 locally-registered 
organizations with some 60,000 members in 1952.38 In the province of 
Salzburg, one ofthe less densely populated Austrian Bundeslander, federal police 
authorities counted 64 registered groups with several thousand members by 
1956. Their charters reveal that among them were associations dedicated to 
comradeship broadly defined (i.e., nonveterans were permitted to become 
members), to nurturing and sustaining friendship between veterans specifically, 
and to shooting clubs.39 
The stated purpose of these associations bore a striking resemblance to one 
another throughout Austria; members of the Kameradschaftsbunde tended to be 
members of the Verband der Unabhangigen (an organization that would crys- 
talize as the FPO by 1955/56)4() and the OVP who shared similar sentiments 
with respect to their wartime experiences. The bylaws of provincial associations 
were often worded vaguely, allowing politically conservative men to promote 
problematic?and for the Socialists and Communists (KPO) on the political 
36. On the evolution of this legislation, see Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 81-88. 
37. Wilhelm Svoboda, '" . . . vorbehaltlos meine Pflicht erfullt': Das Internierungslager 
Glasenbach (Camp 'Marcus W. Orr')," Zeitgeschichte 22 (1995); esp. 12-15. Svobodas essay examines 
the reintroduction into civic life of former Nazis held at the Glasenbach detention camp, including 
the reconstitution of the German-national/liberal camp and the commemorative activities of vet? 
erans. See also Albrich,"'Es gibt keine jiidische Frage,'" 155-59. Albrich points out that because the 
Western Allies' had insisted firmly that Austria's tatus as victim be recognized in State Treaty nego- 
tiations beginning in 1947, many of the Minderbelasteten given amnesty and reintegrated into 
Austrian society felt entitled to argue that they had been victimized twice over?once by the great 
"Prussian swindlc," then by the Allies' insistence that they be marginalized after the war. An effect 
of this development was that Austrian Jews were denied a particular victim status when pursuing 
restitution claims; the Austrian government, in the interest of "fairness" to amnestied former Nazis, 
refused to recognize distinctions among its citizens, all of whom were to be regarded equally as vic? 
tims of the National Socialist regime. Austrian Jews were not permitted to pursue reparations until 
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Left, rather dangerous?notions of fatherland, duty, sacrifice, and remembrance. 
Camaraderie and the sustenance ofthe soldierly ideal nurtured the identities of 
members of Austrian as well as German associations. Paragraph 2 ofthe uniform 
statutes code for the provincial Salzburg branch of the Kameradschaftsbund, for 
example, listed among its purposes and goals a number of points common to 
virtually all regional associations: 
? Promotion of traditional Austrian fatherland and homeland conceptions 
[Vaterlands-und Heimatsgedanken], as well as the cultivation of comradeship 
among members . .. 
? Arrangement of ceremonies in memory of the dead and missing of both 
[world] wars, the care of the burying places of comrades killed in action 
and [otherwise] dead, 
? Creation of monuments in honor ofthe dead and missing of both wars, 
? Comradely proceedings of all kinds for the promotion of sociability . . .41 
Despite the seemingly innocuous wording of these stated purposes, implicit 
within them was a celebration of communitas fraught with values dangerous to 
the principles upon which the Second Republic was founded. Many Austrians 
who had served in the Third Reich's armed forces eagerly communed with oth? 
ers who had shared the experience of warfare-as-crusade.This had much to do 
with the transformative effect of conflict on the Eastern Front, but was perhaps 
even more an expression of the often-repeated theme of struggle in Nazi ide? 
ology. One need not have been a nominal or a convinced Nazi to perceive the 
war as a life-and-death struggle between Germans as Europe's cultural vanguard 
and the destructive force of barbaric "Judeo-Bolshevism"?particularly in the 
context of a racially-driven war of conquest that had become a war for survival 
by the end of 1942. 
Mosse's evaluation ofthe nature and perceived purpose of German veterans' 
associations also holds true to a significant degree for their Austrian counter- 
parts in the following respect: 
well after the State Treaty was signed in 1955. On the notion of politics of memory and victimiza- 
tion in the West German context, see Robert G. Moeller, "War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past 
in the Federal Republic of Germany," American Historical Review 101 (1996): 1008-48. 
38. Heidemarie Uhl, "The Politics of Memory: Austria's Perception of the Second World War 
and the National Socialist Period," Contemporary Austrian Studies 5 (1996): 75. 
39. OStA/AdR, BMLV 3.556-Pras/I/57. Sicherheitsdirektion fur das Bundesland Salzburg. 
Ubersicht iiber die im Amtsbereiche der Bundespolizeidirektion und Bezirkshauptmannschaft 
Salzburg-Umgebung mit dem Stande vom 1.8.1956 bestehcnden Kameradschafts-, Krieger-, 
Schutzen- undVercinen ahnlicher Art sowie vonVereinen, die sich mit dem Flugwesen befassen. 
40. The Vcrband der Unabhangigen (VdU) was a curious combination of former Nazis and 
Deutschnationale types, as well as old-time Liberals who felt they could not find a home on the right 
wing of the SPO or the left wing of the OVP. 
41. OStA/AdR, BMLV 3.556-Pras/I/57. "Statuten des osterreichischen Kameradschaftsbundes, 
Landesverband Salzburg, Kameradschaft Maxglan, 27; Statuten des osterreichischen 
Kameradschaftsbundes, Landesverband Salzburg, Kameradschaft Pfarrwerfen, 225. 
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Camaraderie lost its aggressive implications?the band of comrades against 
the world?and yet something of the older ideal remained, perhaps lying in 
wait to revive the Myth of the War Experience. Close to the center of the 
ideal of camaraderie had been the vision ofthe so-called new man. An effort 
was made in Germany after the Second World War to save this soldierly ideal. 
The most obvious attempt was the continuing glorification ofthe SS both as 
new men and as paradigms of camaraderie. The veterans ofthe SS lamented, 
logically enough, that the fallen had not yet received monuments of iron and 
bronze, and that heroes' groves of the First World War now served merely as 
picnic grounds for weary urbanites.42 
A significant number of soldiers who had fought to protect Austria from 
"bombs, rnisery, hunger, need, and the Russians"?whether or not their under? 
standing of these dangers were refracted through a Nazi prism?were dismayed, 
even insulted, that federal legislation obliged the government to employ 
Austrian officials and devote Austrian resources to the maintenance and securi? 
ty of Allied military cemeteries and monuments. Despoiling these graves and 
memorials was designated a felony and carried a maximum punishment of five 
years' imprisonment.43 Austrian dead from both world wars were not neglect? 
ed; yet, while legislation guaranteed public maintenance of Austrian graves and 
monuments, no federal stipulations were enacted with the legislation to punish 
those who might deface them.44 Although official commemoration represent? 
ed a nod toward the "cult ofthe fallen soldier," for veterans who regarded their 
participation in the war as a sanctified experience this official measure did not 
demonstrate sufficient respect for the supreme sacrifice for Vaterland and 
Heimat. By way of contrast, disgrunded veterans could point to the Nazi 
regime's consecration of the "highest expression of duty,"45 without bothering 
to consider the contextual significance of such duty for Austrians encouraged 
to disassociate themselves from volkisch connotations of Vaterland, Volk, or 
Heimat. 
42. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 217. 
43. OStA/AdR, BMI 56.779-9/1948, Bundesgesetz iiber die Fiirsorge fiir Kriegsgraber und fur 
Kriegcrdenkmaler aus dem 2. Weltkrieg, Referententwurf. See also BGB1. 1948/176, 670: 
Bundesgesetz vom 7. Juli 1948 iiber die Fiirsorge und den Schutz der Kriegsgraber und 
Kriegerdenkmaler aus dem zweiten Weltkrieg fur Angehorige der Alliierten, Vereinten Nationen 
und fur Opfer des Kampfes um ein freies, demokratisches Osterreich und Opfer politischer 
Verfolgung. 
44. BGB1. 1948/175, 669-70: Bundesgesetz vom 7. Juli 1948 uber die Furgsorge fur 
Kriegsgraber aus dem ersten und zweiten Weltkrieg. On the commemoration of First World War 
veterans through momuments and heroes groves, see also Stefan Riesenfellner, "Todeszeichen: 
Zeitgeschichtliche Denkmalkultur am Beispiel von Kriegerdenkmalern in Graz und in der 
Steiermark von 1867-1934," in Riesenfellner and Uhl, Todeszeichen, esp. 17-69. 
45. See Friedrich Grassegger, '"Auch Tote stehn in unsern Reihn': Nationalsozialistische 
Denkmaler des Totengedenkens in der Steiermark (1938-1945)" in Riesenfellner and Uhl, 
Todeszeichen, 99-110. 
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Provocative collaborative studies of Austrian memorials from the two world 
wars by Stefan Riesenfellner and Heidemarie Uhl and by Reinhold Gartner 
and Sieglinde Rosenberger have underscored the importance of Heimat senti- 
ments in commemorative installations, especially in those instances where trib- 
ute was paid to the memory of Nazi era veterans. These men, "who swore an 
oath of loyalty to Hider, were honored as 'Heroes ofthe Heimat.9 In no case is 
the Wehrmacht remembered as a foreign military power that destroyed Austrian 
sovereignty . .. It is also suppressed that this destruction of Austria was imple- 
mented with the considerable assistance of Austrians."46 One recognizes in these 
commemorative statements precisely what Leed refers to in all Europeans lands 
after 1918 as "organized mourning. . . the most acceptable way in which the 
war continued to define the identities of combatants."47 Monuments and 
plaques tended to be constructed in places of special significance, in the public 
squares or cemeteries of quiet little rural villages and small towns dominated by 
conservative councils. There the Soldatentreffen took on the quality of a religious 
ritual, with a march/pilgrimage to a designated site where the commemoration, 
or celebration, of the sanctified Fronterlebnis occurred, the participants dressed 
customarily?and illegally?in old Wehrmacht or SS garb, the procession 
accompanied by patriotic music and singing.48 The local pastor, former unit 
commanders, and town dignitaries would speak to the assembled veterans about 
the heroic sacrifice for home and hearth rendered by the living and the dead of 
the Frontgemeinschaft, and great ceremony attended the care ofthe etemal flame 
for the dead.49 Monuments to soldiers who fell in the service of the Third 
Reich, Uhl notes, outnumber vasdy those to the victims of National Socialist 
terror. The monuments and graves of the latter?Jews, concentration camp 
inmates, or deserters who were either murdered or suffered inhuman treat? 
ment?tend to be relegated to the margins of cemeteries or other inconspicu- 
ous locations.50 
Thorny issues of "duty" and "service" surface here again, for the 
"Austrianness" of the living and the dead had been denied during the war?in 
many instances by the soldiers themselves, definitely by the NS-Regime?in 
46. Gartner and Rosenberger, Kxiegerdenkmaler, 28-29. Uhl,"Erinnerung undVersohnung," 147f. 
47. Leed, No Man's Und, 212. 
48. The linkage between Turner's understanding of the medieval pilgrimage as traditional, reli? 
gious social drama and the personal and social-political nature of the Soldatentreffen as quasi-religious 
social drama is compelling. SeeTurner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 175-77. 
49. Gartner and Rosenberger, Kxiegerdenkmaler, 67-84, 107, 118ff. For an examination of ele? 
ments of continuity from post-First World War to post-1945 commemoration, see Winter, Sites of 
Memory, 82-98. The impressive breadth ofWinter's study addresses this theme in a pan-European 
context. 
50. Uhl, "Erinnerung und Versohnung"; idem, "Erinnern und Vergessen: Denkmaler zur 
Erinnerung an die Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft und an die Gefallenen des 
zweiten Weltkriegs in Graz und in der Steiermark," in Riesenfellner and Uhl, Todeszeichen, 111-95. 
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favor of their inclusion into the German Volksgemeinschqft.51 It should be noted, 
however, that because war memorials frequendy offer the only commemorative 
expression in the smaller localities where Soldatentreffen were so frequendy 
staged, such monuments tend to "institute a relationship to and a presentation 
of the past.. . that reduces the perception of warfare to one of normality," even 
to the extent of glossing over the years 1938-45 and casting the enemy (invari- 
ably the Russians) in an unfavorable light. The end result has tended to be the 
legitimization of duty-encoded memory of the war experience nurtured by 
Kameradschaftsbunde members at the expense of careful reflection on either the 
officially established myth of victimization or on suffering inflicted upon oth? 
ers.52 As an official Kameradschaftsbund position in one weekly newspaper stated 
triumphandy in late 1952, "[While] during 1945 and thereafter the soldier was 
defamed in every conceivable way .. . a healthy perspective has spread through 
Austria by now."53 
Far less documentation exists concerning Soldatentreffen before the conclu? 
sion of the State Treaty in May 1955 than afterward. Certainly a reasonable 
explanation for the existence of only a sketchy record of reunions is that they 
occurred somewhat less frequendy and more surreptitiously than those 
Kameradschaftsbiinde activities which took place after 1955. Because the broader 
political consequence of Soldatentreffen was far riskier prior to the restoration of 
full sovereignty, concerned Austrian authorities minimized their incidence and 
significance, and veterans themselves very rarely chose a public forum in which 
to challenge the Lebensluge. Moreover, the ever-present suspicion of manifesdy 
unrepentant militaristic sentiment provided the occupying powers during the 
early 1950s?particularly France and Russia?with a pretext for questioning 
the continuation of negotiations with the Austrian government toward a treaty 
and for maintaining their military presence at the expense of Austrian taxpay? 
ers. Consequendy, prior to the spring of 1955, the OVP-SPO coalition viewed 
Soldatentreffen and the steady appearance ofWest German Kameradschaftsverbande 
publications across the Austrian border with great alarrn.The concern about the 
latter was no trifling matter, for it represented a fundamental violation of the 
occupiers' criteria for a democratic Austrian press. The minutes of the Executive 
Council of the Allied Control Commission offer valuable insights in such 
instances. The Allied authorities ordered embarrassed Austrian officials to 
impose sanctions against newspapers or periodicals in Austria for violations of 
51. Ernst Hanisch, "Die Prasenz des Dritten Reiches in der Zwciten Republik," in Kos and 
Regele, Inventur 45/55, 45f. 
52. Gartner and Rosenberger, Kriegerdenkmaler, 49-50. 
53. "Ehrenrettung des Soldaten," Sonntagspost, 30 November 1952. Newspaper articles cited in 
this essay do not include page numbers; the clipped citations were researched in the files of the 
Arbeiterkammer fiirWien?Dokumcntation. 
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the Press Decree, particularly insofar as the importation, distribution, and sale of 
such literature was concerned. 
Uniform implementation of such measures proved difficult at best, even 
though communications between Vienna and the provincial authorities were 
consistent on the matter. The difficulty stemmed primarily from the fact that 
the Austrian-West German border remained too porous to control effectively 
the small numbers of copies of contraband literature. This literature could then 
be reproduced in Austria. In such cases the Allies justified the right to engage 
in press controls in order to "assist the Austrian Government to recreate a sound 
and democratic national life based on an efficient administration, stable eco? 
nomic and financial conditions and respect for law and order" and to "ensure 
the institution of a progressive long-term educational program designed to 
eradicate all traces of Nazi ideology and to foster democratic principles among 
Austrian youth.54 Perhaps the most informative evidence regarding Austrian 
Soldatentreffen comes from the West German diplomatic corps, however. West 
German concerns with anti-Soviet and pro-German national sentiments with? 
in segments ofthe Austrian population were relayed in May 1954 to Bruno 
Kreisky, then undersecretary in the Foreign Department of the Austrian 
Chancellery. According to Kreisky s report, the German envoy Muller-Graaf 
had expressed profound dismay that the frequency of Soldatentreffen involving 
German and Austrian veterans and other right-wing Austrian-German cultural 
initiatives, the participation of large crowds, and the "tacdessness on the part of 
the German guests" streaming over the border in bus caravans, or on chartered 
trains, as well as the behavior of their Austrian hosts, had elicited Soviet and 
French fears of a new Anschluss?an apprehension exacerbated by measures dis? 
cussed within Austria, initiated and championed chiefly by the VdU, to abolish 
the visa requirement for travel between West Germany and Austria.55 Moreover, 
Miiller-Graaf objected to a wealth of literature glorifying war and the Nazi era 
that he had encountered at the Graz Book Fair. Kreisky noted in this connec? 
tion that "[Miiller-Graaf] was compelled to tell me, unfortunately, that such a 
thing would not be possible at a German fair, and that, to be sure, [in Germany] 
the interest in this literature is apparendy not as great as in Austria."56 
In a separate report to Chancellor Adenauer, Muller-Graaf emphasized his 
concern that a growing inclination for a new Anschluss had found expression in 
the non-Soviet occupied portions of Austria. This behavior manifested itself in 
a number of ways: an Innsbruck hotelier's enthusiastic celebration of the 
54. OStA/AdR,BKA 6.478-III/SEC/51, Control Agreement for Austria, 28 June 1946,Articles 
3c) and e). See also the Executive Councils discussion over censorship of the Deutsche-Soldaten- 
Zeitung in EXCO/P(52)41 (no minute number), 16 April 1952, and the follow-up meeting, 
EXCO/P(52)41,Minute #1565,16 May 1952. 
55. StBKA,VII, Staatssekretar, Mappe "Deutschland," 1-2. 
56. Ibid., 2 
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German Bundestag elections by having the Deutschlandlied played, to the horror 
of the assembled guests of diverse nationalities, and ex-Field Marshal 
Kesselring's trip to Austria?in violation of an expression of strong disapproval 
on the part of Austria's Interior Minister, Oskar Helmer (SPO)?to address 
assembled Austrian veterans in full NS-era uniforms and decorations. Muller- 
Graaf concluded with an exhortation that the West German and Austrian gov? 
ernments agree to cooperate in a crackdown against German-Austrian 
Soldatentreffen on both sides of the border. To this end, Muller-Graaf had made 
a personal entreaty to the Bavarian minister president to police these events.57 
The anxiety expressed by the Foreign Ministry in Bonn represents an unequiv- 
ocal expression of official West German antipathy toward Soldatentreffen and 
Anschluss sentiment. Indeed, Muller-Graaf's alarm vis-a-vis developments in 
Austria reflected the West German government's concern that expressions of 
soldierly camaraderie and aggressive pan-German sentiment would derail the 
delicate ongoing diplomatic work toward future German reunification. 
Complaints raised by the Soviet occupation authorities concerning the cele? 
bration of military values and the expression ofAnschluss sentiments would have 
been easier for Austrian officials to shrug off if it were solely a matter of small 
groups of veterans gathering in isolated locations to engage in the commemo? 
ration of comradeship and sacrifice. Far more damaging to Austrian credibility 
was the toleration, and in some cases outright support, extended to 
Kameradschaftsbunde by those entrusted with monitoring them: Austrian officials. 
Compelled to exercise damage control, Chancellor Julius Raab (OVP) dis? 
missed Soviet concerns in a speech before parliament in May 1954 with the 
emphatic statement,"No one in Austria thinks of an Anschluss!"?despite Soviet 
and 4ustrian communist claims that the copresence of German and Austrian 
veterans represented an upsurge in potential support for a closer West German- 
Austrian connection.58 Raab added, with support from the assembled SPO and 
OVP representatives, that: 
[S]uch a personal meeting has nothing to do with military aims.The Austrian 
authorities regularly demand?and shall continue to do so in the future? 
that these meetings refrain from any and all political activities. I believe that 
57. StBKA,VII, Staatssekretar, Mappe "Deutschland:" Box-BMfAA Bonn, Osterreichbeziige I, 
Mappe 5,2-3. See also ALCO/7(54)218, Minute #1868f, 14 May 1954, in which the Russian High 
Commissioncr flichev raised pointed objections against the "further and considerable strengthening 
of fascistic and militaristic tendencies in Austria," through Kameradschaftsbunde led by former Nazi 
gcnerals,"in uniforms ofthe Hider-Wehrmacht with decorations and rank designations," as well as 
against the extension of these connections between like-minded bodies in the Federal Republic of 
Germany suid Austria. The French High Commissioner Payart expressed similar concerns to 
Miiller-Graaf, particularly with respect to the fanfare generated by the Kameradschaftsbunde to 
accompany the Kesselring visit. 
58. Raab,"Erklarung der Bundesregierung," Sten.Prot.NR.VIL G,R, 39th Session, 19 May 1954, 
1,626. 
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these soldiers' reunions will soon have run their course. In no way does the 
Austrian government condone the participation of high military leaders of 
Hider's army in such reunions.59 
Despite the chancellor's denial, these meetings did, in fact, have an implicidy 
political content, particularly when one considers the tone ofVdU pronounce- 
ments regarding Soldatentreffen. In an effort to explain that his party's support 
for Kameradschaftsbunde and reunions was apolitical, the former Wehrmacht offi? 
cer and veterans' group member Max Stendebach advocated a position that 
exemplified the persistence of the very pan-German sentiments that Raab had 
denied existed within Austria. According to Stendebach, the concept of the 
nation-state had proven itself not viable in the twentieth century, and efforts to 
use force to unite nations into states had created nothing but deplorable vio? 
lence and misery. Thus, he concluded, discussion of a future Anschluss was not 
on the agenda.60 Nonetheless, Stendebach added ominously that Austria and 
Germany shared an incontestable, long-standing connection, expressed in the 
fellowship of participants at Soldatentreffen: 
I have expressed myself plainly and clearly in favor of Austrian independence 
but have also said: [with respect to] national connections, the border 
[between Germany and Austria] is nonexistent for us, it is of no significance. 
If we have this point of view, why should we still be induced to generate 
Anschluss propaganda?61 
Such statements did litde to reassure the Allied Control Commission that 
potentially revanchist sentiment had been rooted out of Austrian political cul? 
ture. 
59. Ibid., 1,627. The OVP parliamentarian Lujo Toncic-Sorinj added the measured comment 
"[We must appreciate the fact] that the soldiers of both world wars want to meet and to exchange 
their shared experiences. There is hardly an event that continues to affect a man's soul as that of the 
war- and front experience. We are, of course, entirely opposed to the misuse of these soldiers' 
reunions for any other purposes. The participants of these meetings should also ask themselves 
whether, aside from their admittedly legitimate interests in keeping alive a shared tradition, they 
contribute something positive to the present Austrian state. One cannot live only in the past, and 
especially former soldiers have the duty to consider whether, through these activities, they may 
cause trouble for Austria." Sten.Prot.NR,VII. G.P., 39th Session, 19 May 1954,1,636. For a critical 
OVP perspective on Kameradschaftsbunde and Soldatentreffen, see also the OVP magazine Der 
Aufbruch (1958/9): 28, in which the politically moderate author criticizes the cultivation of tradi? 
tion in veterans' associations:" . . . here and there stir the spirits of those who dwell in the past. Not 
only in Germany, but in Austria too. Out of every corner and crack they creep forward in many 
forms and recount their old songs: of Reich, of death, of glory.They pratde their half-truths in tav- 
erns and at Kameradschaftstreffen. They confuse heroism with megalomania, readiness to sacrifice 
with heroic death on the field of their interests. They abuse, in order to win the youth, the dead of 
the last war, for their 'new concept'." Cited in Sten.Prot.NR.VIII. G.P., 69th Session, 3 December 
1958,3,185. 
60. Stendebach, Sten.Prot.NR,VII. G.P, 39th Session, 19 May 1954,1,651. 
61. Ibid. 
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If members of the governing Catholic conservative-social democratic coali? 
tion shared Raab's optimism that the activity of Kameradschaftsbunde would soon 
abate, a second, enthusiastic wave of Soldatentreffen and commemoration after 
the state treaty revealed to them their naivete. These associations had always 
expressed overwhelmingjy anti-Soviet sentiments in newspaper articles or edi- 
torials, and government officials had hoped that the impetus for such a disposi- 
tion would be eliminated upon withdrawal of the unwelcome Soviet military 
presence.62 Rather than abate, however, the anti-Soviet tone of the veterans' 
association rhetoric actually intensifted after USSR occupation forces left Austria 
by the end of 1955. Members of Kameradschaftsbunde fancied that their activities 
had represented a kind of spiritual resistance to Soviet occupation. Thus, the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops represented a moral, even quasi-military victory for 
many who had fought on the eastern front between 1941 and 1945.The "offen- 
sive war in defense of Vaterland and Heimat" carried out over ten years with the 
same steadfastness as the war on the Ostfront had been waged?albeit with very 
different means?had resulted in a delayed, yet monumental victory over bol- 
shevism, and confirmed for conservative-minded veterans that these associations 
could serve as a medium through which the exorcism ofthe red menace could 
and should be celebrated.63 
"Victory" over the Russians via the State Treaty in 
1955 enabled Kameradschaftsbund advocates, such as the FPO parliamentary 
deputy Fritz Stiiber, to draw the tenuous, provocative conclusion from a link? 
age of Nazi antibolshevism with Cold War-era antipathy toward the Soviet 
Union that deeds committed during the war, and since 1945 condemned as 
criminal, could now be brazenly justified or relativized. 
After, at Nuremberg and elsewhere, German execution of hostages and mea? 
sures of reprisal against guerillas and partisans were declared crimes against 
humanity and punished with thousands of death sentences and thousands of 
years of imprisonment, after the entire German people were branded with 
62. Soviet representatives to the Allied Commission took extreme interest in the censorship of 
the Austrian press, where their American, British, and French counterparts, reluctant to introduce 
controls without absolute certainty that books and newspapers in question possessed pro-Nazi, pan- 
German revanchist, militaristic, or anti-Allied content, frequently checked Soviet designs. See dis? 
cussion of the periodical Berichte und Informationen and the newspapers Echo der Heimat and Wochen 
Echo in EXCO/M(51)182, Minute #2319, 2 March 1951 and EXCO/P(51)185, Minute #2354, 
20 April 195 1, as well as review of von Cholitz's Soldat unter Soldaten, EXCO/P(53)43, Minute 
#2823,17 April 1953 and von Papcn's Die Wahrheit: Eine Gasse, EXCO/P(53)40, Minute #2812,2 
April 1953. Echo der Heimat was eventually banned under ACA orders when its editor crossed the 
line separating cautious apology from outright glorirkation of Nazi foreign policy. See 
EXCO/P(52)50, Minute #2595,7 May 1952. 
63. In this light, the selfsame certitude of the "ultimately victorious" veterans in 1955 was 
expressed in the fervor ofajunior Wehrmacht officer trapped in Stalingrad in late 1942: "This war 
compels us again to make the deepest exertion of all of our powers. . . . But still we want to hold 
on because we know: it must be done for our own, for our children's, and our people's future . . ." 
Cited in Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 214. 
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the shame of Oradour and Lidice, and very soon after the ashes of the hanged 
and burned were scattered to the winds and the flesh of the executed 
German officers and men has hardly decomposed, French troops are hurling 
bombs and grenades into villages in Morocco against a civilian population 
(admittedly a refractory one). France sat as judge at Nuremberg and there 
issued its damning judgment for deeds similar to those she has now commit? 
ted in North Africa, with an air of ingenuousness, as military necessity.64 
At other moments, Kameradschaftsbund supporters accounted for deeds done by 
Austrians and Germans in uniforms of the Third Reich with language far less 
controversial and confrontational, invoking a kind of grand international and 
transhistorical fraternity of frontsoldiery with an almost conspiratorial wink. In 
this vein, the FPO parliamentarian Heinrich Zechmann, another veterans* 
advocate asserted "soldiers are always soldiers, the same thing is demanded from 
soldiers every where . . ."65 Not unlike right-wing veterans after 1918, 
Kameradschaftsbund members projected an image of the veteran as the servant of 
his national community, with an understanding of the needs of Volk and Heimat 
far superior to that of leftist politicians and their ostensibly divisive class-driven 
political concerns.66 
Commemoration of Comradeship after 1955 
Once the State Treaty restored Austrian sovereignty, ending the occupation 
powers' authority formaUy, a second, and in many respects higher profile, wave 
of Kameradschaftsbund activity surfaced. Barely a week after the treaty was signed, 
Ferdinand Graf, a leading Interior Ministry official and later the Second 
Republic's first defense minister, addressed a Soldatentreffen at Bad St. Leonhardt 
im Lavanttal, Styria, at which members of veterans, associations appeared in old 
imperial, First Republic,Wehrmacht, and current Second Republic Bundesheer 
(federal army) attire. According to Graf it was not the uniform, but the charac? 
ter of the man who wore it that distinguished the soldier from the war crimi? 
nal, reactionary, or fascist.67 In one particularly ostentatious, but by no means 
isolated display of solidarity, a veterans' gathering of uniformed former Waffen- 
SS men took place in Innsbruck with the apparent blessing of the OVP mayor. 
The keynote speaker was a former SS general and West German citizen. An 
64. Fritz Stiiber, Sten.Prot.NR,VII. G.P., 77th Session, 7 September 1955,3,491. My italics. For 
many of the former Nazis and SS men who had been held in what they designated exaggeratedly 
as the "concentration camps" of Glasenbach and Wolfsberg?detention facilities for war criminals, 
Minderbelastete, and prominent Nazis operated by the U.S. and British occupation authorities, 
respectively, into the later 1940s?the State Treaty may very well have been regarded as a victory 
over the Anglo-Americans as well. See Svoboda," Das Internierungslager Glasenbach." 
65. Heinrich Zechmann, Sten.Prot.NR,VII. G.P., 69th Session, 3 December 1958,3,183. 
66. Leed, No Man's Und, 196. 
67. "Zwischen 'Ohne uns* und '08/15,'" Osterreichische N ue Tageszeitung, 24 May 1955. The 
event occurred on May 23rd. 
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address was also delivered by the regional Bundesheer commandant, who, 
according to newspaper reports, praised the "comradely connection" of soldiers 
of the Austrian Second Republic and former Austrian members of the 
Wehrmacht "to members of the former Waffen-SS."68 Self-congratulatory 
speeches emphasized "duty well done" and praised sacrifices offered bravely for 
the honor and glory of Volk and Vaterland. The initially solemn commemora? 
tion concluded with copious eating and spirited drinking. In yet another high? 
ly publicized incident on 15 September 1958, a Soldatentreffen occurred at 
Hainburg an der Donau, direcdy across the Austrian-Czechoslovak border from 
Bratislava, at which the mayor (this time a Socialist) presided over a gathering 
of former Wehrmacht soldiers wearing their old uniforms and decorations.The 
local Bundesheer unit provided its band to play marching music and to accom- 
pany the field mass celebrated by the parish priest.69 
Events of this kind violated the legislative ban on wearing Third Reich uni? 
forms and emblems, and represented an embarrassing challenge to an Austrian 
political culture founded on the myth of victimization and the tacit injunction 
against any behavior which called the myth into question. If the actions of ex- 
soldiers were not trouble enough for the government, a number of senior non- 
commissioned and commissioned Bundesheer officers with World War II com? 
bat experience cleariy did not take this prohibition seriously, even arriving 
occasionally at Soldatentreffen in the uniforms of their First Republic or Third 
Reich military service. These actions violated not only Austrian law; they also 
contravened ?20 of the Bundesheer General Service Regulations Code, which 
mandated that members of the Austrian armed forces wear only the military 
uniform of the Second Republic. It is quite evident, though, that enforcement 
of such codes proved extraordinarily difficult, particularly because local FPO, 
OVP, and occasionally even SPO officials were sympathetic to the creation, 
goals, and festive gatherings of Kameradschaftsbunde, in some cases they were 
even enthusiastically supportive.70 Participants and patrons alike seemed uncon- 
cerned that such sentiments and activities called into question the official 
Austrian rejection of National Socialism and the glorification of martial values, 
and represented an affront to the high-minded principle of freedom of assem? 
bly and expression when behaviors expressed antidemocratic sentiment. The 
activities of Kameradschaftsbunde and the firm support lent to them by FPO lead? 
ers and certain prominent conservative Catholic politicians alarmed those con- 
68. OStA/AdR, BMLV 44.542-Wpol/58. The Bundesheer's political division rcgularly moni- 
tored such reports. The case was reported by both the communist Volksstimme, 23 August 1958 and 
the moderate Salzburger Tageblatt, 23 August 1958. 
69. OStA/AdR, BMLV PID/III/5d/58. 
70. A hcarty repect for martial values was a common sentiment among a great many conserva? 
tive Catholics. Part of their emotional compensation for Austria's tatus as a small, divided state was 
the glorification of the power and majesty of the Habsburg Empire, including its military tradition. 
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cerned with a resurgent romanticization of warfare. For Communists, Social 
Democrats, and progressive circles within the OVP, the values, goals, and sym? 
bolic action common to veterans' associations throughout Austria elicited 
unsettling memories of fascist glorification of the military. As a countermeasure, 
during the later 1950s, left wing journalists vigorously denounced reunions 
involving former Waffen-SS men and Wehrmacht members, taking it upon 
themselves to remain vigilant against Soldatentreffen on behalf of the republic. 
The Communists, with their proud and legitimate claim as the most active 
antifascist resistance group, wanted no part in these veterans' associations, and 
the groups were pleased to accommodate their scruples.71 In many instances, 
Kameradschaftsbunde charters included clauses which, in addition to requiring 
military service in either world war, demanded that prospective members were 
men who "lead an ethically irreproachable life"?a coded reference to "pious" 
and conservative-minded individuals.72 "Godless Reds," those who had 
opposed either the First or the Second World War (even though they might 
have participated in them), and other somehow suspect (i.e., leftist) prospective 
members would have found themselves unwelcome. The incorporation of ill- 
concealed antileftist, antipacifist, and antirevisionist clauses in Kameradschaftsbund 
statutes and the tendency for commemorative monuments to eschew reference 
to those who died as a result of their opposition to the Nazi regime amounted 
to a delegitimization of those who questioned Frontgemeinschaft values and 
rejected NS-encoded notions of duty and honor.73 
Opinion within the Social Democratic camp on membership in 
Kameradschaftsbunde was divided. A vocal group composed largely of left-wing 
party members feared the potential for veterans' associations, particularly those 
organized as shooting clubs, to assume the militant antisocialist, antidemocratic 
quality of Austria's interwar fascist paramilitary. This concern was underscored 
when a number of associations in Tyrol and Vorarlberg sought federal autho- 
rization to carry rifles, in order that they might serve as territorial militias.74 
Others within the SPO feared that the rival superpowers might capitalize on a 
general resurgence of militaristic spirit to press European youth into service in 
preparation for a future East-West conflict. Prior to the creation of the 
71. On the KPO's resistance activity, see Radomir Luza, The Resistance in Austria (Minneapolis, 
1984), 99-155. 
72. See for example OStA/AdR, BMLV (BKA/ALV) 241.751-Pras/56. Sicherheitsdirektion fur 
das Bundesland Niederosterreich (Zl. 7.754/1 -SD), betr. Bildung von Kameradschafts-und 
Schiitzenvereinen; Meldung, 25 September 1956. Statuten der Heimkehrervereinigung Obritz 
(Bezirk Hollabrunn)?3,2. 
73. See again Uhl, "Erinnerung alsVersohnung," esp. 149ff. 
74. Neues Osterreich, 6 May 1959. The Interior Ministry refused to sanction the distribution of 
weapons to private associations.These "local defense associations," in turn, rejected a suggestion that 
they be incorporated into the Bundesheer as as kind of reserve corps, not unlike the National Guard 
in the United States. 
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Bundesheer in mid-1955, these Social Democrats had voiced concern that 
Kameradschaftsbunde might provide the backbone for a reactionary federal army, 
just as it had during the 1920s, with the possibility that Austrian and other 
European Social Democratic labor movements might be crushed by right-wing 
dominated military forces.75 The party's official position on veterans' associa? 
tions was voiced by the SPO Central Secretary Otto Probst, however, who 
argued that party members should seek entrance into such groups precisely 
because of the possibility of lingering fascist inclinations in veterans' groups. A 
social democratic presence, Probst argued, would contribute effectively to nip- 
ping these sentiments in the bud. 
It is up to the party delegations in the provinces to oversee the activities of 
the Osterreichische Kameradschaftsbund and to call upon their members active 
therein to thwart all attempts and demonstrations that would be of a military 
character and at the same time to prevent the subjection of the 
Kameradschaftsbund to the decisions of the Osterreichische Volkspartei. 
Members of the Socialist Party, insofar as they belong to the 
Kameradschaftsbund, must make sure that the latter is not misused for political 
purposes and that its members do not take part in gatherings, demonstrations, 
or other events which violate the constitutional laws of our democratic 
republic or which could do harm to the reputation, dignity, and honor of our 
people and our state.76 
Despite the party's official, rather naive belief that veterans' groups might assume 
a new character through the quasi-conspiratorial activity of a very small group 
of Social Democrats, the SPO was not at all prepared to discontinue its criti? 
cisms of these associations. All in all, if left-wing vigilance did not always result 
in the implementation of restrictions against Kameradschaftsbunde activities, its 
watchdog role helped to heighten public awareness ofthe potential danger and 
very real embarrassment represented by the existence of such organizations.77 
This was particularly true where Social Democratic activity was concerned; 
while the Communists were tainted in the eyes of most Austrians because of 
their intimate connection to the hated and feared Soviet occupation forces in 
75. See Fritz Konir and Anton Mayrhauser, SPO-PTP 1953,94-95 and 97, respectively. 
76. Probst conveyed the party leadership s position, drafted a month earlier, to the assembled 
conference delegates: Probst, PTP 1953,1 lO.Those who shared his perspectives added that Socialists 
had served admirably as soldiers since 1934, and suggested that if the organizations were politically 
inoculated through SPO members, such associations might provide useful locations for the cultiva? 
tion ofpro-Austrian sentiment. See also the statement delivered by the Salzburg-Stadt representa? 
tive Kurt Preussler, a decorated Social Democratic veteran, SPO-PTP 1953,104f. 
77. The KPO party chief Johann Koplenig criticized the tendency of participants at festive vet? 
erans' reunions, with their fond reminiscences of the war years, to represent a conflict in which mil- 
lions died and many more suffered as a kind of "Sozialtourismus in field gray [feldgrau]!' 
Sten.Prot.NR,VIII. G.P., 42nd Session, 4 December 1957,1,735. 
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Eastern Austria, Social Democrats could criticize the seemingly unrepentant 
disposition of veterans' groups without being dismissed as Russian lackeys. 
Feckless, apologetic statements such as Heinrich Zechmann's "soldiers will be 
soldiers" had long antagonized members of the left-wing parties and progressive 
Volkspartei supporters. With the end of the occupation, Social Democrats, in 
particular, felt compelled to check the enthusiasm with vigilance and criticism. 
SPO critics energetically pointed out the danger in linking duty?including acts 
of brutality committed under the National Socialist banner?with the senti- 
mental "cultivation of tradition" that Kameradschaftsbunde arrogated to them? 
selves. In doing so, however, Social Democratic derogators themselves tended to 
avoid championing a critical position on the vexing, unresolved question of the 
individual soldier's culpability for war crimes, given, as noted, that many soldiers, 
even if they had not been Nazis, had been socialized through schooling and mil? 
itary training to accept certain NS precepts?some of which may have been not 
entirely unlike positions supported before the Anschluss (e.g., virulent anticom- 
munism, racist anti-Semitism). Rather than confront this difficult element of a 
more comprehensive Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, the SPO directed its concerns to 
the future, to the gradual transformation of Austria toward a social democratic 
society based on principles of cooperation, solidarity, pacifism, and social justice. 
This future-orientation, which served to repress confrontation with the past in 
its own right found two principle forms of expression. Many a Social 
Democratic mayor or municipal official tolerated violations of the law prohibit- 
ing the wearing of Nazi symbols, if only for reasons of political expediency. 
Given the large number of veterans among the Austrian electorate, first with the 
enfranchisement of the Minderbelasteten in 1949, later with the return of thou? 
sands of Austrian prisoners of war from Soviet detention throughout the early 
and middle 1950s, SPO leaders at the local, provincial, and federal level recog? 
nized the importance of winning the electoral support of veterans.78 Second, as 
a party coresponsible for governing Austria, the SPO felt caught between its 
conviction that the increasingly vocal presence of Kameradschaftsbunde required 
firm legal countermeasures and its own reluctance to violate the taboo protect- 
ing the fragile belief in Austrian vktimization. Accordingly, Social Democratic 
rhetoric vis-a-vis veterans' groups differed from the sharp, accusatory style of the 
Communists, which depicted every Kameradschaftsbund member as a would-be 
harbinger of a second Anschluss.79 
78. See Svoboda,"Das Internierungslager Glasenbach," 12-16. 
79. Volksstimme editorials and the statements of Communist politicians were couched routinely 
in accusatory fashion, often expressed as rhetorical questions: "The Landser who had spent so many 
years with each other and had lain in the mud together would like to see one another again, 
exchange their memories and what has become of their 'buddies.'Yet why are these mass meetings 
necessary if they want to see friends again? A private reunion gives, indeed, far more opportunity 
to exchange memories. And why do Kameradschqftstreffen almost always become political demon? 
strations?" Biertisch,Westerwald, und Hakenkreuz," Osterreichische Volksstimme, 10 August 1958. 
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Throughout the 1950s SPO critics of veterans' groups focused on the viola- 
tion of legal ordinances against wearing Third Reich uniforms and emblems so 
common at veterans' gatherings and against the politicized activity of 
Bundesheer personnel at rallies and reunions. By the end of the decade, persis- 
tent criticism from the political left appears to have succeeded in propelling the 
OVP-dominated chancellery toward demonstrating an interest in enforcing the 
law against the wearing ofWehrmacht or SS uniforms, as well as preventing the 
attendance of uniformed Bundesheer servicemen at reunions.80 The tendency 
for many of the veterans present at such gatherings and commemorations to 
wear World War II decorations complete with swastika recalled unsavory polit? 
ical sentiments, and the Socialists, increasingly concerned with issues of feder- 
ally-managed staatsburgerliche Erziehung (civics education)?especially for chil? 
dren, in the interest of a genuinely democratic future civic culture?pointed out 
that this form of expression, itself implicidy political, presented to members of 
the younger generation an ambiguous message regarding the Nazi period.81 
Gradually, OVP officials in the chancellery came to see Kameradschaftsbunde and 
their activities as symbolic expressions of not merely confused, but more impor- 
tandy volatile political sentiments. This recognition resulted in overwhelming 
parliamentary support for legislation in 1960 that forbade "wearing or other? 
wise displaying the symbols of organizations forbidden in Austria,"82 but did not 
prohibit veterans from wearing World War II decorations not bearing the 
swastika?an incomplete victory at best for resistance fighters, racial or political 
victims of National Socialist policy, and left-wing politicians and pedagogues, 
for it did not censure those who endorsed or participated in Nazi militarism. 
80. Bundesheer soldiers who participated in reunions, marches, or demonstrations did not ini? 
tially or consistendy comply with ?36 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Wehrgesetz, which granted soldiers 
the full rights of nonuniformed citizens, but prevented them from participating in political activity 
in uniform. See OStA/AdR, BMLV 234.843-I/Pras/56, Vereine zur Pflege der militarischen 
Kameradschaft; Mitghedschaft und Tragen der Uniform bei Veranstaltungen, 27 August 1956. 
Chancellory officials expressed greater concern that the Austrian soldiers might be brought into 
closer contact with "West German institutions," forbidden under ?4 of the State Treaty. Raab's staff 
seemed to indicate thereby that they were far less concerned with the enthusiasm for Soldatentreffen 
emanating from Austrians, and focused instead on the international legal ramifications of connec? 
tions between veterans on both sides of the border; to direct attention to the former issues would 
have been to admit that certain residual pan-German, if not necessarily Nazi sentiment persisted in 
the Second Republic, in contradiction to his assertion that no affinity for closer connection with 
Germany existed in Austria. See OStA/AdR, BMLV 501.098-RB/55. BKA/ALV an das BMI- 
GDOS, 20 September 1955. 
81. The OVP representative Alfons Gorbach expressed the opinion that because Austrians had 
always been valiant soldiers, they should be allowed to wear medals won during the Second World 
War, and if these decorations bore the swastika this was no longer a living symbol, but a reminder. 
He was not at all clear, however, as to what sort of reminder this would be, and did not recognize 
the inconsistency in wearing medals as a grim keepsake to celebrate the glory of fallen soldiers. 
Stcn.Prot.NR,VIII. G.P., 15th Session, 6 December 1956, 512-23. This contradiction was pointed 
out by the SPO s Marie Emhart, ibid., 527-28. 
82. BGBI. 1960/84,611. 
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Furthermore, the senior governing party remained divided over the significance 
of veterans' associations; indeed, the OVP Minister of Defense Graf, a former 
Third Reich military officer himself, denied consistendy that the presence of 
federal troops as official honor guards at war monuments, soldiers' graves, or sol? 
diers' cemeteries violated Bundesheer statutes. On the other hand, Soldatentreffen 
became politicized, left-wing critics contended, whenever individuals?espe? 
cially prominent personalities such as Graf?blindly praised a tradition associat- 
ed with oppressive regimes.83 Communists and Social Democrats, despite their 
bitter and fundamental programmatic differences, remained rather united in 
their rejection of both the conservative, Catholic character ofthe old monarchy 
and the militant nationalism and violent racial intolerance of National 
Socialism. 
Conclusion: Revisiting the Politics of Identity 
in Austrian Political Culture 
This essay has explored how veterans sought to reestablish an exclusive form of 
community on the basis of their shared frontline experience during the 1950s, 
and examined the sometimes conflicting reaction on the part of Austrian 
authorities concerned with preventing unrepentant veterans' groups from con- 
tradicting the myth of victimization upon which the Second Republic was 
founded.84 The goal of veterans' associations was to nurture the collective iden? 
tity of those who had shared a transformative experience?not solely, or even 
primarily political lobbying for the establishment and maintenance of war-relat- 
ed disability or service pensions.85 Kameradschaftsbunde may not have been sig? 
nificant in terms of the size of the population they represented. Nonetheless, 
they offered a certain highly structured revivification of the existential bond 
between survivors, and commemoration of the connection between the living 
and the dead for those Austrians who relished camaraderie, sought to deny cul- 
83. See for example the complaint forwarded to Raab by SPO deputies Rudolf Singer, Rudolf 
Appel, and Kurt Preussler regarding the presence of high-ranking, uniformed Bundesheer officers 
at a festival honoring the Austrian dead of both world wars at the Prandtauer-Kirche in St. Polten, 
Lower Austria on 12 May 1957.Two uniformed Bundesheer soldiers also served as the honor guard. 
OStA/AR, BMLV 26.547-Wpol/57,23 May 1957,3-4, as well Die Arbeiter-Zeitung, 25 May 1957. 
For Minister Grafs devensive response, see OStA/AdR-BMLV 26.547-Wpol/57, 24 May 1957, 
5-6, as well as the following reports in OVP newspapers: "Eine uberflussige SPO-Anfrage. Keine 
Parteipolitik im Bundesheer," Kleines Volksblatt, 26 May 1957; "Heldenehrung ist keine 
Parteipolitik," Unzer Volksblatt, 27 May 1957. 
84. VictorTurner reminds us that such examples of normative communitas re formed "under the 
influence of time, the need to mobilize and organize resources to keep the members of a group 
alive and thriving, and the necessity of social control among those members in pursuance of these 
and other collective goals .. "Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 169. 
85. Associations representing the interests of Austrian veterans who returned home between the 
late 1940s and 1955 from Soviet POW camps should not be confused with Kameradschaftsbunde in 
this respect, although Heimkehrer representation in veterans' associations was not entirely unusual. 
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pability for war crimes, and resented the perceived humiliation of postwar occu? 
pation. While politicized right-wing Austrian and German Second World War 
veterans did not, as onetime, self-proclaimed neue Menschen, seek to destabilize 
society through acts of antisystemic violence?unlike their counterparts a gen? 
eration earlier?the dislocation of their particular liminal experience imprinted 
itself deeply upon their postwar lives: 
The soldier was a man who had lived for a seemingly endless period of time 
beyond civilian social categories, beyond any but purely formal and mechan? 
ical class distinctions. The experience of living outside of class, but in ranks, 
as socially declassified or not yet classified individuals, was productive of an 
undeniable sense of comradeship among those who shared this situation. But 
it was also productive of an inability to link up the social experience of war 
with the social problems and political issues of postwar society.86 
Irrefutable military defeat and the Western Allies' decision to reconstruct 
German-speaking Central Europe after 1945, rather than to seek retribution as 
in 1918/19, preempted the kind of crisis resulting from the inability to reinte- 
grate veterans that had plagued both German and Austrian societies during the 
interwar years. Western initiatives were influenced, of course, by perceptions of 
Cold War geopolitical exigencies, and facilitated by the integration of Western 
Germany and Austria, formally or de facto, into the Western community 
through generous Marshall Plan support.87 
For Kameradschaftsbund members, however, the inability or unwillingness to 
acknowledge the highly-charged political symbolism of Soldatentreffen and to 
comprehend their wider social and political ramifications were reinforced by 
Western material assistance and the Westem-sponsored myth of Austrian vic? 
timization. Right-wing veterans could explain away the exceptional scale of 
violence on the eastern front, nourished by an atmosphere of unprecedented 
intolerant, racist nationalism, with language that resonated with elements of 
Nazi weltanschauung. The juxtaposition of Austrian particularism, expressed 
through the notion of victimization and internalization of the conviction that 
the Austrians, as a distinct part ofa larger German Volksgemeinschaft,ss had sac- 
rificed themselves for the preservation of the Western cultural inheritance 
against the hitherto "most sinister of Asiatic onslaughts" drew back the curtain 
somewhat, revealing the fragility of the hebensluge. Insofar as organized, right- 
wing veterans persevered in their stubborn interpretation of the Cold War as a 
86. Leed, No Man's Land, 200. 
87. See, for example, Giinter Bischof, "'Austria looks to the West': Kommunistische 
Putschgefahr, geheime Wiederbewaffhung und Wcstorientierung am Anfang der funfziger Jahre" in 
Osterekh in den Funfzigern, ed. Thomas Albrich, Klaus Eisterer, Michael Gehler, and Rolf Steininger 
(Innsbruck, 1995), 183-209. 
88. See the Herr Lang case study in Ziegler and Kannonicr-Finster, Osterreichs Gedachtnis, 
173-92. 
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continuation of the "noble struggle" against Bolshevism, however, the sanctity 
of the Frontkampfer experience was preserved.89 Two sets of factors are impor? 
tant in this context. First, for Kameradschaftsbundler the reenfranchisement of the 
Minderbelasteten in 1948/49, the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Austria in 
1955, and the general amnesty for all Ehemaligen (former) National Socialists in 
1961 represented decisive victories in an ultimately successful crusade. Second, 
the Moscow Declaration's pronouncement on Austrian victimization created an 
official, public memory of the wartime experience, which produced and per- 
petuated the private memory of individuals who could reflect upon their indi? 
vidual experience as one of victimization. 
As the testimonial of representative Austrian veterans in the work of Meinrad 
Ziegler and Waltraud Kannonier-Finster attests (representative of all postwar 
political camps, and with divergent attitudes toward the Nazi regime prior to 
1938), some Austrians were quite capable of reconstructing their individual 
experiences as Opfer, despite having participated in the war, and even having 
supported the Nazi regime. A great number had hoped for economic rejuvena- 
tion from the Anschluss in 1938, yet were disillusioned by the devastation and 
privation the war visited upon them; others felt victimized by a Nazi regime 
which, they contended, had betrayed the ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft it had 
promised by treating Austrians as second-class Germans. Others felt a certain 
compulsion to support the regime out of fear of the consequences. For some 
soldiers, victimization assumed the form of the execution of their professional 
duties in the face of real or imagined snubs or ridicule from their "Prussian" 
comrades-in-arms; for others, victimization entailed detention in prisoner of 
on 
war camps. 
The volatile elements of the Austrian past, manifested in the embarrassment 
veterans' groups posed to the government, have been repressed, but clearly not 
resolved. The fallout from Kurt Waldheim's presidential election and Jorg 
Haider's guest appearances at Soldatentreffen suggests in no uncertain terms that 
the "grammar" of Austrian political culture?particularly the curious phenom? 
enon of an untruth concerning victimization (or at best, a partial truth) serving 
as the "Magna Carta" of the Second Republic?have, to the present, not pre? 
served foundational taboos from violation. It suggests that a substantial and vocal 
minority of young and old alike is unwilling to sustain the delicate psychic bal- 
ance upon which the Lebensluge rests, and has been prepared to seek alternatives 
to Social Democratic or Catholic conservative visions of the future under 
recent post-Cold War conditions of instability and uncertainty. As the last of the 
Kameradschaftsbundler pass away, the challenge that these new right-wing critics 
represent to the Second Republic's dominant political discourse reflects the lack 
89. Gartner and Rosenberger, Kriegerdenkmater, 115. 
90. Ziegler and Kannonier-Finster, Osterreichs Geddchtnis, 87ff. 
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of resolution in conflicting notions of PftkhterfiiUung vs. victimization in 
Austrian public and private memory, and the ambiguousness of Austria's rela? 
tionship to Germany throughout the twentieth century.91 
John Carroll University 
91. Iwo examples illustrate this point. First, in reaction to the increased presence of "undesir- 
able" foreigners from the eastern Mediterranean and southern or eastern Europe in Austria in the 
1980s and early 1990s taking jobs and putting Austrians out of work, Haider presented a speech 
praising the "orderiiness" and "efficiency" ofNazi Beschtftigungspolitik. His comments were received 
enthusiastically by most FPO supporters, but the embarrassment and consternation it provoked 
prompted Haider to step down from his position as provincial governor of Carinthia in June 1991, 
after a tenure of little more than two years. The foreign presence in Austria is less than 10 percent 
ofthe total population, and their employment is overwhelmingly in tasks and physical labor high? 
ly undesirable to most Austrian citizens. The second example pertains to the discovery of skeletal 
remains dated, initially, from the earry-mid 1940s at a construction site in Lambach, Upper Austria 
in late January 19%. The find prompted the following remarks from some ofthe town's residents: 
"Where are the Jews in there, then?";"Is it known for certain that those are Jews? Or are they our 
German soldiers?" Cited in "Lambacher Skelettrunde: 'Sans eh unsere deutschen Soldaten'?" Profil 
6 (3 February 19%): 23. 
